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Abstract
This paper examines how managers at the top of a public institution, central
bank executives, allocate their working time. Using detailed information
from personal diaries of the six members of the European Central Bank’s
Executive Board over a period of two years, we codify and analyze more
than 3,700 reported activities and compare the results with recent findings
on the time use of CEOs in the private sector. We report four additional
observations. First, the daily schedule of central bankers is dominated
by routine tasks; variations in economic uncertainty have, on average, no
significant effect on the number of activities. Second, there are sizable
differences in the scope of activities across board members. Third, the
change in publication rules of diary entries from ‘on request’ to ‘regular’
was associated with a significant decline in reported activities. Fourth,
nationality matters: Board members interact disproportionately often with
fellow nationals.
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“I’m late, I’m late, for a very important date.”
Alice in Wonderland
(Walt Disney Productions, 1951)
1 Introduction
Central banks typically face a challenging trade-off when communicating about
their activities. On the one hand, the provision of information is widely believed
to improve the effectiveness of monetary policy making. Being open about goals
and strategies makes a central bank accountable. Also, explaining decisions and
their background allows observers to better anticipate central bank actions. The
European Central Bank (ECB), for instance, pursues, in line with this reasoning,
a policy of ‘forward guidance’, providing explicit statements on the future path of
monetary policy (European Central Bank, 2014).1
On the other hand, central banks value confidentiality. With respect to policy-
making, it is argued, for instance, that too much information, instead of providing
additional insights, possibly confuses agents, thereby increasing uncertainty. Ex-
ternal review may also distort internal behavior. Ha¨ma¨la¨inen (1998) notes, for
instance, that “[i]f detailed minutes and voting records were published, the dis-
cussions of the collegial [ECB] Governing Council would certainly become less
frank and open-minded.” Vickers (1998) argues, more generally, that “there is
surely information relevant for policy-making that is simply incapable of being
put in the public domain.”2 Overall, in view of these conflicting arguments, van
der Cruijsen, Eijffinger, and Hoogduin (2010) conclude that there may be an
optimal degree of central bank transparency.
In this paper, we examine a novel feature of central bank transparency, the
release of the meeting calendars of leading central bank executives. Before publi-
cation of this information, insights into the daily schedule of top central bankers
were limited; they were also highly selective. Descriptions from inside central
banks are basically restricted to autobiographies by central bankers, which are
typically written and published years after their term of office has expired and
often take a nuanced, not necessarily balanced perspective.3 External characteri-
zations of work habits and routines include biographies and central bank histories;
1A number of papers provide empirical evidence in line with this view. Fata´s, Mihov and Rose
(2007), for instance, argue that having a quantitative target for monetary policy tends to
lower inflation and smooth business cycles. Dincer and Eichengreen (2014) find that greater
central bank transparency is associated with lower average levels of inflation and lower inflation
variability.
2Issing (1999, p. 517-18) notes, in similar fashion, that “[w]e make no claim for complete
transparency and we do not pretend to live in a perfect ‘glass house’.” Conti-Brown (2016, p.
266) even argues that “the Fed’s governance is complicated, confused, and opaque.”
3An exception may be public statements by central bank officials in which they describe their
daily routine. For example, when asked about how he managed to find the time to write a
bestselling (though controversial) book, a former Executive Board member of the Deutsche
Bundesbank noted that as central banker, work was done by Tuesday afternoon (Sarrazin,
2011).
2
these portrayals, however, hardly provide a comprehensive account of day-to-day
activities of central bankers.
Our analysis of the time use of central bankers draws on detailed listings
of the daily events of the ECB’s key officials, including its President and Vice-
President, which have been recently made available mainly in response to requests
under the European Union Freedom of Information rules. After all, despite various
dimensions of independence, the ECB is a public institution and its staff members
are public servants. Consequently, the data and information provided to the public
should meet certain standards in terms of completeness and accuracy.
After digitizing and codifying the information from the calendars of the (six)
Executive Board members of the ECB, we compile a data set that covers more
than 3,700 individual activities for two non-consecutive years over the period
from 2014 to 2016. We then analyze this data along various lines. Apart from
providing stylized facts about management practices and daily routines in a public
institution, we particularly aim at identifying empirical regularities of central
bankers’ activities related to the mandate and tasks of the central bank.
Previewing our main results, we find that the daily schedule of the ECB’s
Executive Board members is dominated by routine tasks. A substantial share
of the reported activities is represented by meetings that take place at regular
intervals. Also, there is no variation in activities over time that can be reasonably
related to economic fundamentals. Across individual board members, in contrast,
there are considerable differences in both the number and range of activities,
possibly explained, in part, by their different responsibilities within the institution.
Examining joint patterns in diary entries, there is strong evidence of a secrecy bias.
With the change in publication rules from ‘on request’ to ‘regular’, there has been
a measurable decline in reported activities. We also find, in line with Badinger
and Nitsch (2014), that nationality matters. Board members tend to interact
disproportionately often with fellow nationals.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the
relevant literature. Section 3 describes the institutional background and discusses
features of our data. The heart of our paper is Section 4, which presents the
empirical model and estimation results. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Our paper links to various strands of research. An established literature, for in-
stance, examines issues in central bank design. Among the wide range of features
discussed, a large body of work focuses on the size and structure of central bank
decision-making bodies, especially monetary policy committees. Another design
feature, which is of even more relevance to us, is central bank communication.4
4In practice, the communication policies of central banks differ substantially around the world;
policies also turn out to be frequently adjusted and retailored. While there is no consen-
sus on which communications strategy constitutes ‘best practice’ for central banks, Blinder,
Ehrmann, Fratzscher, De Haan, and Jansen (2008) argue that more and better central bank
communication helped to improve the predictability of monetary policy decisions.
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Blinder, Ehrmann, Fratzscher, De Haan, and Jansen (2008) review the rapidly
growing empirical literature and conclude that communication policy is an im-
portant instrument in the central banker’s toolkit.
Another set of papers aims to empirically assess the effects of management.
Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen (2012) examine differences in the organization of
firms across countries. Other papers analyze the effects of managers (Bertrand
and Schoar, 2003) and management practices (Bloom, Eifert, Mahajan, McKen-
zie, and Roberts, 2013) on firm policies and firm performance. After documenting
considerable variation in managerial styles and practices, these papers typically
find that managers and management have a sizable impact on organizational per-
formance.
The paper that is most closely related to ours is Bandiera, Guiso, Prat, and
Sadun’s (2010) study on the time use of managers. After having collected, with
admirable effort, detailed information on how CEOs allocate their time between
different work activities, they document a number of stylized facts of CEO be-
havior. CEOs are found, for instance, to spend the largest part of their days with
other people, most of whom belong to the firm. More importantly, the more time
the CEO spends with insiders, the better the company does.
Bandiera, Guiso, Prat, and Sadun (2010) examine extremely detailed time use
data, covering, in principle, all the activities of CEOs that last longer than 15
minutes. The data is recorded by the CEOs’ personal assistants for the period of
a pre-specified week (from Monday to Friday). It is collected for 94 CEOs of top-
600 Italian firms. Our data, in contrast, is public information. It covers selected
activities of six top executives of a public institution, the ECB, for a period of
two non-consecutive years (including weekends).
3 Institutional Background and Data
3.1 Institutional Background
In our empirical analysis, we examine the daily schedules of the six members of
the Executive Board of the ECB. The board consists of the President, the Vice-
President and four members who are all formally appointed, for a non-renewable
term of eight years, by the Council of the European Union at the level of heads
of government and heads of state.5 While dates of appointment differ, ensuring
that not all members need to be replaced at the same time, the composition of
the board is unchanged over our sample period. Table 1 lists the members of the
board, who served terms during our sample period and provides some personal
background information.
< Table 1 here >
5The European Parliament is also consulted. It cross-examines the candidates at a public
hearing in its Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee, then discusses the candidacy in a
parliamentary plenary session. It has no power to veto an appointment, however.
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The board runs the central bank’s day-to-day business. Among other duties, it sets
the agenda for ECB meetings, prepares the economic analyses and makes initial
recommendations on policy. Operational decisions are taken jointly. However,
each member also has responsibility for important functions of the central bank;
see Appendix Table A1. The board forms, along with the governors of the national
central banks of the (currently 19) euro area countries, the Governing Council,
which is the main decision-making body of the ECB, responsible for formulating
monetary policy for the euro area.
3.2 Data
On Friday, 30 October 2015, the ECB issued a press release in which it announced
that it will publish, from now on, the monthly meeting calendars of its Executive
Board members.6 Since the calendars are published after a disclosure period of
about three months, the first diaries, with data for November 2015, were released
in February 2016. Since then, the meeting calendars have been published regularly
on a monthly basis.7
In its press release, the ECB motivated the introduction of this new element in
the central bank’s communication strategy, which complements the information
already available to the public (such as the weekly schedule of speaking engage-
ments, speeches, and transcripts of media interviews), by “the ECB’s commitment
to transparency and accountability”. Three days later, however, on Monday, 2
November 2015, the Financial Times reported, in a front page story, that the
newspaper has obtained meeting calendars of the Executive Board members after
a freedom of information request.
While the ECB’s initial press announcement went largely unnoticed, with no
coverage in major newspapers, the Financial Times story made headlines because
the data show that some board members had met market participants either
during or shortly before key policy meetings, thereby illustrating the tight links
between central bank officials and the financial services industry. The information
provided to the Financial Times, covering the period from August 2014 to the end
of July 2015, is available on request from the ECB’s communications division.
Based on this information, we compile a data set of the activities of the Exec-
utive Board members of the ECB for two non-overlapping periods of 12 months
from August 2014 to July 2015 and from November 2015 to October 2016. For
each activity, the calendars provide the date and location of the activity as well
as a brief description.8 In total, our data set comprises 3,723 entries, or about 0.8
(1.2) entries per member and (business) day, with considerable variation across
board members and over time. The last column of Table 1 tabulates the number
of reported activities by board member.
6The press release is online available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2015/
html/pr151030.en.html
7The information is online available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/orga/
transparency/calendars-of-the-EB-members/html/index.en.html
8The calendars for the first 12-month period also include the actual time of the activity, which
we do not explore here.
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After digitizing the information from the calendars, we codify the data and
generate two additional variables. First, we classify calendar entries by type of
activity. In particular, we categorize each activity under one of 21 headings,
generally distinguishing between i) official duties, which typically take place at
regular intervals and where participation is de facto mandatory (e.g., Executive
Board meetings), and ii) other, ‘less-official’ activities, referred to as meetings
in the following, where participation is not always mandatory or based on invita-
tions (e.g., participation in conferences), or which take place on a board member’s
initiative.9 The types of activities are listed in Table 2. Second, whenever pos-
sible, we identify the nationality of the Executive Board members’ counterpart
involved in the activity. Meetings with counterparts for whom the nationality is
identifiable account for about one third of the reported activities (1,311 entries).10
< Table 2 here >
Finally, we augment our calendar data with variables from standard sources (such
as, for instance, the ECB’s capital subscription key).
3.3 Descriptive Statistics
The monthly calendars list only selected activities. These activities include ap-
pointments with external parties, unless release of the information could under-
mine the protection of public interests recognized at EU level, and various internal
meetings, most of which are regularly scheduled. The calendars miss, however,
many irregular, unscheduled internal activities of the board members and therefore
provide only an incomplete picture of the entire use of central bankers’ working
time. Still, they contain valuable information that can be exploited to derive
interesting insights.
Table 3 describes the (reported) activities of the ECB’s Executive Board mem-
bers along various dimensions. When calendar entries are classified by type of
activity, for instance, it turns out that activities of board members are almost
equally split between official duties and meetings (see above). Moreover, among
those other management assignments, which typically imply interactions with out-
siders, meetings with government officials dominate, followed by meetings with
representatives of media and of the financial services industry.
It is also interesting to note that, despite the considerable variation in inter-
nal and external counterparts, the majority of the reported activities take place
at the headquarters of the ECB in Frankfurt, Germany. Other frequently vis-
ited locations include places in Germany, Belgium (which hosts many European
Union institutions), and the United States. Finally, reviewing interactions with
9Strictly speaking, both types of activities are ‘part of the job’ of a central banker and hence
official.
10For example, Peter Praet’s calendar lists a “meeting with BBVA”, a Spanish banking group,
in Milan, Italy on September 11, 2014 (from 8.30 to 9.15am). For this event, the geographic
location (Italy) and the nationality of the counterpart (Spain) differ, and both features are
codified.
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counterparts from a specific country, meetings with government officials top the
list of interactions with nationals from major European countries, while meetings
with the financial industry are the most frequent activity with counterparts from
the United States (and also the United Kingdom, for which results are not shown).
< Table 3 here >
Figure 1 illustrates patterns in activities over time. The upper graph, which
plots the number of activities by month, displays a weak seasonal pattern, with
a notable decline in activities during holiday seasons, especially in the month of
August. The lower graph presents the analogue for the days of the week. This
graph shows that the busiest period for board members is the middle of the week.
However, a non-negligible share of activities also takes place on weekends, thereby
reflecting an irregular work schedule, which seems typical for top executives.
< Figure 1 here >
4 Empirical Results
The calendar entries and their descriptive statistics provide some interesting in-
sights into the daily work schedule of central bankers. However, for a more sys-
tematic assessment of Executive Board members’ behavior (at work), we now turn
to more comprehensive statistical analysis.
4.1 Transparency
We begin our empirical analysis of the board members’ calendar entries by examin-
ing the consistency in reporting activities over time. In particular, we hypothesize
that the change in publication rules for the calendars of the board members from
‘on request’ to ‘regular’ has been associated with a change in the willingness to
disclose information to the wider public. After all, knowing in advance that diary
entries will be made public may affect how the board members keep their diaries.
To analyze this issue empirically, we set up and estimate empirical models of the
form:
NumEntriesmt = βDumRegulart + γm + δs + εmt, (1)
where NumEntriesmt is the log of the number of monthly calendar entries of
board member m at time t, DumRegulart is a dummy variable taking the value
of one in observation periods, where the calendar has been released regularly
as part of the ECB’s communication strategy (and zero otherwise), γm and δs
are sets of member-specific and calendar month-specific fixed effects, respectively,
with the latter capturing seasonal variations in the number of entries, and εmt is
an idiosyncratic error term. The parameter of interest to us is β, which captures
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systematic changes in reporting behavior between the two periods with different
publication rules.
Table 4 presents the results of a least squares estimation of equation (1). In
the first column, we consider aggregate time-series data on calendar entries, using
as regressand the total number of reported activities in a given month, summed
over all Executive Board members. With one observation per month, there are
only 24 observations used in this tentative regression. Still, as shown in column
(1), the estimate of parameter β is negative and, with a t-statistic of about 3.7,
highly statistically significant. Moreover, the estimated effect is sizable in mag-
nitude, suggesting that the number of reported activities decreased by about 28
percent after the regime shift, which made publication of the board members’ cal-
endars a regular part of the communication strategy of the ECB. This finding is
an indication that from then on calendar entries have been screened more critically.
< Table 4 here >
Column (2) exploits the panel dimension of our data and replicates the analysis for
the cross-section of individual board members and the same time period. Apart
from increasing the number of observations by factor six, this specification also
allows to control for differences in reporting behavior between board members by
including Executive Board member fixed effects. Reassuringly, the results remain
qualitatively and quantitatively unchanged with this extension.
In the remaining four columns of Table 4, we examine a possible explanation for
the observed decline in the number of reported activities of the ECB’s Executive
Board members. In particular, it seems plausible that, after the switch to the
regular release of their meetings calendars, board members tend to report fewer
activities of the type, which led to public criticism after the ad hoc publication
of their diaries, especially meetings with the private sector. Accordingly, the
decline in the number of calendar entries should be particularly observable in
these categories of diary entries, while the change in publication rules is expected
to have had little or no consequence for the number of activities related to official
duties. As shown in columns (3)-(6) of Table 4, however, the estimated decline in
the number of reported activities is negative in all specifications and, if anything,
larger in magnitude for official duties than for non-official activities (meetings),
therefore refuting this hypothesis.
To further analyze this issue, Figure 2 plots the estimates of β for each type
of activity listed in Table 2, using the monthly number of reported activities in a
given category instead of the total number of activities as regressand. Considering
the results for various types of official duties (plotted at the top of the figure) in
more detail, it is remarkable that the number of reported Executive Board and
Governing Council meetings has fallen considerably, despite the fact that the reg-
ular frequency of Governing Council meetings has remained unchanged over the
sample period.11
11As a rule, the Governing Council holds its meetings twice a month, with exceptions being
possible (for instance, to accommodate special holiday situations). The interval of Governing
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< Figure 2 here >
Part of the explanation is a drop in irregular Governing Council meetings, es-
pecially teleconferences.12 Moreover, the decline in reported Governing Council
meetings has been partly compensated by an increase in the number of meetings
of (other) ECB committees. Most importantly, however, and as shown in the mid-
dle of the figure, board members also report, in line with intuition, significantly
fewer meetings with government, media and bankers after the practice of regularly
publishing the board members’ monthly calendars had been established.
4.2 Responsibilities
In our next empirical exercise, we explore the cross-section variation in the scale
and scope of individual board members’ activities. Specifically, it may be argued
that central bank executives, similar to top managers in the private sector, per-
form both internal business functions as well as external representation functions.
These functions are likely to differ across positions, depending on the board mem-
bers’ responsibilities. For example, the President of the ECB is expected to have
more external appointments than other board members. Appendix Table A1 lists
the distribution of responsibilities across members of the ECB’s Executive Board.
We compare the meetings calendars of board members along various lines. In
general, our estimation equations takes the form:
ShEntriesmt =
∑
m
βmDumMemberm + δs + εmt, (2)
where ShEntriesmt is the share of selected activities (such as official duties) in
the total number of monthly calendar entries of board member m at time t,
DumMemberm is a dummy variable which identifies an individual ECB Executive
Board member m (such as the President), δ is a comprehensive set of calendar
month-specific fixed effects, and ε is the error term. Using shares instead of plain
numbers of calendar entries as dependent variable not only corrects for differences
in the number of reported activities across board members, it also deals with the
change in reporting behavior after the switch in publication rules.
In our analysis, we proceed sequentially. In the upper panel of Table 5, we
tabulate the estimates of β for the President of the ECB, Mario Draghi, relative
to all other members of the Executive Board (meaning that their parameters are
effectively restricted to equality and captured by the constant term). To describe
individual work schedules, we compute two variables, which we use as regressands:
the share of official duties in total activities (column (1)) and the share of reported
Council meetings dedicated to monetary policy changed from monthly (the first Governing
Council meeting of the month) to eight times a year, starting in January 2015; see https:
//www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2014/html/pr140703_1.en.html
12With a view to ensuring that ECB decisions can be adopted at any time, the Executive
Board established a regime for the adoption of decisions by means of teleconferencing; see
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/en_dec_1999_7_f.pdf
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activities taking place at the headquarters of the ECB (column (2)). For both
measures, however, it turns out that the estimated parameters are statistically
indistinguishable from zero, indicating that the President’s schedule does not de-
viate systematically from the average of other board members along these two
dimensions.
< Table 5 here >
The lower panel of Table 5 reports analogous panel estimates, including dummy
variables for each individual Executive Board member (apart from the President
reflected by the constant term). Interestingly, six of the ten parameter estimates
take values that are significantly different from zero. There is evidence, for in-
stance, perhaps not surprisingly, that the daily schedule of Benoˆıt Cœure´, who is
the board member responsible for international relations, is predominantly char-
acterized by irregular meetings and activities. Also, since a non-negligible share
of his activities is devoted to meetings with external parties, many of his activi-
ties take place outside of the ECB. For the remaining board members, with the
exception of Peter Praet, a disproportionately large share of internal activities is
reported.
4.3 External Conditions
Our data set on the calendar entries of ECB Executive Board members has, in
comparison with other time use data, advantages and disadvantages. An obvious
shortcoming is the relatively small sample size, both in terms of the number
of individuals for whom data are available and in the scale and scope of daily
activities on which information is released to the public. On the other hand,
a major asset of our data set is the long time frame of 24 months over which
activities are recorded, thereby allowing us to reasonably examine variation in
individual behavior over time.
In our empirical analysis, we relate the daily schedules of the Executive Board
members to economic conditions faced by the central bank. Although the ECB
is engaged in a wide range of tasks, the ECB primarily defines and implements
monetary policy with the aim of maintaining price stability, which is its primary
objective.13 Consequently, the internal workload may depend measurably on the
level of complexity and uncertainty involved in assessing the macroeconomic en-
vironment in the euro area.
In our analysis, we make use of a new measure of economic policy uncertainty.
Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016) construct country-specific indices of uncertainty
by searching the digital archives of international newspapers for certain keywords
13Hartmann and Smets (2018) apply textual analysis to identify the topics that were addressed
in 1,892 public speeches by the ECB’s Executive Board members for the period from May
1998 to April 2018. Despite a remarkable breadth of issues, the core theme of monetary policy
and inflation covered a sizable share of speeches most of the time.
10
(including, but not limited to, “uncertainty” or “uncertain”).14 We relate the
number of reported activities to their index for Europe and expect the work sched-
ule of central bankers to intensify (and the number of activities to increase) in
times of greater economic policy uncertainty.15
Figure 3 plots the uncertainty index along with the total number of board
member activities over time. While there is some notable variation in uncer-
tainty, with a particularly strong increase in uncertainty in the year 2016, the
monthly number of board member activities seems to be mainly dominated by a
seasonal pattern. Therefore, there is no obvious visual evidence of a relationship
between uncertainty and board members’ activity.
< Figure 3 here >
To further analyze this issue, we expand equation (1), which accounts for the
structural break in reporting behavior, and estimate equations of the form:
NumEntriesmt = αUncertaintyt + βDumRegulart + γm + δs + εmt, (3)
where the variables are defined as before and Uncertaintyt is the log of the eco-
nomic policy uncertainty index for Europe in period t from Baker, Bloom, and
Davis (2016).
Table 6 presents the results. Analogous to Table 4, we begin with a time series
analysis, using as dependent variable the total monthly number of reported board
member activities, aggregated across all board members. In this specification, the
estimate of α takes a counter-intuitive negative sign, although the coefficient is
only weakly significant at the 10 percent level. However, the estimated coefficient
increases in both (absolute) value and statistical significance when we apply a
panel data approach and analyze activities at the level of individual board mem-
bers (column (2)). Counter to our expectations, therefore, our empirical results
suggest that the effect of policy uncertainty on board member activity is, if any-
thing, negative.
< Table 6 here >
In the remaining columns of Table 6, we tabulate the estimation results for official
and non-official activities, respectively. While the parameter estimates of α again
14The data are regularly updated and available online, in monthly frequency, at http://www.
policyuncertainty.com/. For the European index, Baker, Blook and Davis (2016) draw on
two newspapers per country: Le Monde and Le Figaro for France, Handelsblatt and Frank-
furter Allgemeine Zeitung for Germany, Corriere Della Sera and La Repubblica for Italy, El
Mundo and El Pais for Spain, and The Times of London and Financial Times for the United
Kingdom. All our results remain virtually unchanged when their index for Europe is replaced
by an individual country-level index of uncertainty.
15We obtain similar results when we use the uncertainty index for the euro area compiled by
Husted, Rogers, and Sun (2016).
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indicate a strong decline in official activities during times of uncertainty, we do
not obtain any robust results for meetings.16
Overall, the daily schedule of central bankers seems to be dominated by a
regular work routine. Specifically, there is no evidence that the working time
of Executive Board members, according to their reported activities, varies with
external economic conditions (e.g., becomes more hectic during times of greater
uncertainty). This finding suggests, as it is comforting to note, that established
routines and procedures are often sufficient to deal with challenging situations.
4.4 Home Bias
In the ECB, as in any other European Union institution, staff members are ex-
pected to perform tasks in the interest of the (entire) European Union (or, for that
matter, euro area). Therefore, the national background of candidates is typically
not considered to be an important selection criterion for appointment and pro-
motion.17 For Executive Board members, for instance, the EU Treaty stipulates
that the person “shall be appointed from among persons of recognized standing
and professional experience in monetary or banking matters.”18
In practice, however, nationality matters – a lot. In the Executive Board,
the largest member countries of the euro area, Germany, France, and Italy, ac-
complished to have a national representative in this management circle since the
establishment of the ECB, thereby continuously filling three of the six positions.
Badinger and Nitsch (2014) note that national representation in the top manage-
ment of the ECB is narrowly spread across countries and find, more alarmingly,
that monetary policy decisions seem to be linked to national representation in the
core business areas of the ECB.
In the following, we examine the intensity of the ECB’s Executive Board mem-
bers’ national ties in terms of i) the frequency of their home country visits and
ii) the frequency of their meetings with fellow nationals. Obviousy, significantly
more frequent activities in the home country or with fellow nationals would be
indicative of strong home country linkages (or ‘home bias’).
To analyze this issue, we estimate the following model:
NumEntriesmct = βDumHomemc + ξXct + γm + ηc + θt + εmct, (4)
whereNumEntriesmct is the number of monthly calendar entries of board member
m with counterparts from country c at time t, DumHomemc is a dummy variable
which takes the value of one when a counterpart’s country is the home country
of the board member (and zero otherwise), Xct is a vector of additional control
16Since equation (2) extends equation (1) by a control variable, it is worth noting that the
qualitative and quantitative results regarding the effect of the change in the reporting rules
(reflected by the estimate of β) remain unchanged for meetings, whereas the effect on the
reporting of official duties is rendered insignificant.
17As a general rule, however, the ECB appoints only nationals of European Union member
states, in line with the Staff Regulations of officials of the European Communities.
18See Article 109a of the Treaty on European Union, online available at https://www.ecb.
europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/maastricht_en.pdf
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variables, γm, ηc, and θt are comprehensive sets of member, country-, and time-
specific fixed effects, respectively, and ε is the error term.
We employ alternative empirical specifications of our estimation model. In a
first set of exercises, we focus on the location of the activities reported in the board
members’ calendars. We begin with a qualitative analysis, using as regressand a
binary dummy variable which takes the value of one when a board member m has
paid an official visit to a country c in a given month t (and zero otherwise). Our
panel is balanced and contains (6 members × 24 months × 41 countries =) 5,904
observations. The results are tabulated in the upper panel of Table 7.
< Table 7 here >
Column (1) presents the estimation results from the most parsimonious specifi-
cation of equation (4), a bivariate probit regression, which includes only our key
explanatory of interest, the home country identifier. As shown, the estimate of
β is positive and statistically highly significant, indicating that there is strong
evidence of a home bias in the board members’ travel activities as it implies that
a country is more likely to be visited by an Executive Board member, in official
function, if it is his or her home country. However, while interesting, the result is
only suggestive since it is bivariate.
Accordingly, in column (2), we additionally include controls, which proxy the
relative attractiveness of countries as travel destinations from a central banker’s
perspective such as a country’s economic weight (measured by the national share
in the ECB’s capital) and whether the country visited is the home country of
other Executive Board members (measured by a dummy variable). The estimated
coefficients on these controls take the expected (positive) sign. Moreover, with
this extension, the point estimate of β is reduced by more than one half. Still,
the estimated home bias effect remains of significance, both economically and
statistically.
The effect is also robust to splitting the sample by publication period (and,
therefore, also reporting standards), as shown in columns (3) and (4) of the table.
In the final column of Table 7, we examine the most demanding specification of
equation (4), including comprehensive sets of board member-, time- and country-
fixed effects. Reassuringly, the estimation result is qualitatively and quantitatively
unchanged.
The lower panel of Table 7 presents the analogues estimates, replacing the
binary variable with the actual number of reported activities in country c in a given
month as dependent variable. For this perturbation, using a Poisson estimator
to take account of the count nature of the regressand, our findings again remain
remarkably robust.
Table 8 replicates the analysis from Table 7. However, instead of focusing on
the location of a reported activity, the nationality of the partner, if identified, is
taken into account. It is reassuring to note that the results not only turn out to
be robust to this perturbation, but increase in magnitude and significance.
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< Table 8 here >
In sum, there is strong evidence that Executive Board members tend to keep
strong national ties. They visit their home country more often; they also report
more frequent activities with national compatriots. For governments of euro area
member countries, therefore, it may be particularly attractive to place a national
individual in the ECB’s Executive Board.
5 Conclusions
For a long time, central banks have been accused of being secretive, a view that
seems to be remarkably persistent. For example, Posen (2013, p. 166) writes, at
the beginning of his review of journalist Neil Irwin’s inside story of the world’s
most powerful central bankers, a bestselling book entitled “The Alchemists”(!),
“Central bankers have always carried a mystique far beyond justification. Even
as their policies and procedures have become markedly more transparent, the air
of secrecy and power about them persists.”
In reality, central banks have become strikingly more open over time. Ac-
cording to Haldane and McMahon (2018), there has been even a ‘communications
revolution’, with an exponential growth in central bank communication over the
past 70 years. Moreover, Blinder (2018) predicts that transparency is likely to in-
crease further. Arguing that transparency is a one-way street, he claims (p. 567)
that “[o]nce a central bank moves toward greater transparency in some dimension,
it never reverts back to its old, less-transparent ways.”
Among the central bank information disclosed to the public recently are listings
of the daily schedule of the central bank’s top executives. These listings not only
provide interesting insights into how managers allocate their working time in a
public institution, thereby complementing findings for the private sector, but also
contain information useful for the understanding of the practice of monetary policy
making.
In this paper, we analyze the activities listed in the published meetings cal-
endars of the six members of the ECB’s Executive Board. Based on this data,
we find, perhaps not surprisingly, that the daily schedule of the ECB’s key ex-
ecutives is dominated by routine tasks. It is interesting to note, however, that
there are sizable differences in the scope of activities across board members (e.g.,
participating in events, which take place outside of the headquarters of the ECB),
which are possibly explained, at least in part, by the members’ different respon-
sibilities within the organization. From a policy perspective, the most relevant
result is that board members tend to interact disproportionately often with fellow
nationals. As a result, national representation in the ECB matters.
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Table 2: Categorization of Calendar Entries
Official Duties Meetings
Executive Board Academics
Governing Council Associations
Supervisory Board Bankers
ECB committees Companies
Fora Conferences
European Union
EU institutions
Former officials
Government
Media
National central banks
Non-governmental organizations
Organizations
Other
Receptions
Supervised entity
Notes: Each calendar entry has been categorized into one of the listed categories.
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Table 3: Characterizations of ECB Executive Board Member Activities
Indicator Number % of Total
By Activity:
Official Duties 1, 649 44.3
Internal Meetings 1, 230 33.0
Meetings 2, 074 55.7
Government 342 9.2
Media 303 8.1
Bankers 226 6.1
By Location:
ECB 2, 176 58.4
Germany (outside ECB) 330 8.9
USA 243 6.5
Belgium 232 6.2
By Partner and Activity:
USA 229 6.2
Bankers 74
Government 51
Academics 45
European Union 151 4.1
Fora 150
Germany 150 4.0
Government 76
Academics 32
Bankers 17
France 141 3.8
Government 75
Bankers 35
Academics 14
Notes: The total number of calendar entries is 3,723.
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Table 4: Publication Rules and Reported Board Member Activity
All Activities Official Duties Meetings
Sample Total Member Total Member Total Member
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DumRegular −0.280∗∗ −0.281∗∗ −0.301∗ −0.311∗∗ −0.247∗ −0.258∗∗
(0.076) (0.046) (0.103) (0.045) (0.087) (0.075)
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Member FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 24 144 24 144 24 143
Adj. R2 0.79 0.75 0.67 0.72 0.75 0.61
Notes: OLS estimation. The dependent variable is the log of the number of monthly calendar
entries. Robust standard errors in parentheses. **, * and # denote significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 5: Responsibilities and Board Member Activity
Share Official Duties Share Location ECB
a) President
Dummy Draghi 0.033 -0.054
(0.025) (0.034)
Month FE Yes Yes
Observations 144 144
Adj. R2 0.19 0.13
b) Other Board Members
Dummy Cœure´ −0.127∗∗ −0.178∗∗
(0.032) (0.041)
Dummy Constaˆncio 0.047 0.092∗∗
(0.032) (0.034)
Dummy Lautenschla¨ger 0.000 0.148∗∗
(0.031) (0.046)
Dummy Mersch 0.017 0.143∗∗
(0.032) (0.043)
Dummy Praet -0.100* 0.066
(0.038) (0.045)
Month FE Yes Yes
Observations 144 144
Adj. R2 0.38 0.46
Notes: OLS estimation. The dependent variable is the share of activities listed in the first row
in the number of monthly calendar entries. Robust standard errors in parentheses. **, * and #
denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 6: Economic Policy Uncertainty and Board Member Activity
All Activities Official Duties Meetings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample Total Member Total Member Total Member
Uncertainty −0.347# −0.421∗∗ −0.740∗∗ −0.753∗∗ 0.018 -0.135
(0.167) (0.137) (0.210) (0.119) (0.216) (0.236)
DumRegular −0.154∗ −0.128∗ -0.032 -0.037 −0.254∗∗ −0.209∗
(0.051) (0.058) (0.065) -0.046 (0.073) (0.104)
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Member FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 24 144 24 2424 14424 2424 14324
Adj. R2 0.80 0.76 0.77 0.77 0.73 0.61
Notes: OLS estimation. The dependent variable is the log number of monthly calendar entries.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. **, * and # denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level, respectively.
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Table 7: Home Bias and Places of Board Member Activity
Baseline Controls Publication
Request Regular
Fixed
Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
a) Activity in Home Country
Dummy Home Country 1.504∗∗ 0.663∗∗ 0.745∗∗ 0.592∗∗ 0.787∗∗
(0.107) (0.115) (0.161) (0.165) (0.128)
Dummy EB Countries 0.769∗∗ 0.787∗∗ 0.750∗∗
(0.073) (0.102) (0.104)
Capital Key 0.054∗∗ 0.058∗∗ 0.049∗∗
(0.005) (0.008) (0.008)
Member FE No No No No Yes
Time FE No No No No Yes
Country FE No No No No Yes
Observations 5,904 5,904 2,952 2,952 5,904
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.19 0.21 0.18 0.39
b) Number of Activities in Home Country
Dummy Home Country 1.876∗∗ 0.586∗∗ 0.590∗∗ 0.581∗∗ 0.731∗∗
(0.155) (0.159) (0.214) (0.215) (0.155)
Dummy EB Countries 1.290∗∗ 1.383∗∗ 1.176∗∗
(0.150) (0.215) (0.200)
Capital Key 0.059∗∗ 0.069∗∗ 0.044∗∗
(0.011) (0.015) (0.014)
Member FE No No No No Yes
Time FE No No No No Yes
Country FE No No No No Yes
Observations 5,904 5,904 2,952 2,952 5,904
Pseudo R2 0.04 0.14 0.18 0.1 0.43
Notes: a) Probit estimates. The dependent variable is a dummy variable, which takes the
value of one if a board member reports an activity in a country in a given month. b) Poisson
estimates. The dependent variable is the number of monthly calendar entries in a country by
board member. Robust standard errors in parentheses. **, * and # denote significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 8: Home Bias and Counterpart of Board Member Activity
Baseline Controls Publication
Request Regular
Fixed
Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
a) Activity with Counterpart from Home Country
Dummy Home Country 1.592∗∗ 0.979∗∗ 0.998∗∗ 0.961∗∗ 1.055∗∗
(0.105) (0.119) (0.167) (0.169) (0.120)
Dummy EB Countries 0.418∗∗ 0.411∗∗ 0.427∗∗
(0.081) (0.114)) (0.116))
Capital Key 0.057∗∗ 0.061∗∗ 0.053∗∗
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008)
Member FE No No No No Yes
Time FE No No No No Yes
Country FE No No No No Yes
Observations 5,920 5,920 2,962 2,958 5,920
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.16 0.17 0.15 0.33
b) Number of Activities with Counterpart from Home Country
Dummy Home Country 2.453∗∗ 1.415∗∗ 1.561∗∗ 1.204∗∗ 1.354∗∗
(0.140) (0.146) (0.197) (0.206) (0.141)
Dummy EB Countries 0.528∗∗ 0.400∗ 0.687∗∗
(0.146) (0.201) (0.210)
Capital Key 0.093∗∗ 0.104∗∗ 0.079∗∗
(0.010) (0.013) (0.015)
Member FE No No No No Yes
Time FE No No No No Yes
Country FE No No No No Yes
Observations 5,920 5,920 2,962 2,958 5,920
Pseudo R2 0.10 0.17 0.20 0.14 0.43
Notes: a) Probit estimates. The dependent variable is a dummy variable, which takes the value
of one if a board member reports an activity with a counterpart from a country in a given month.
b) Poisson estimates. The dependent variable is the number of monthly calendar entries with
a counterpart from a country by board member. Robust standard errors in parentheses. **, *
and # denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table A1: Distribution of Responsibilities of Board Members, 2014-16
Mario Draghi, President
Communications
Counsel to the Executive Board
ESRB Secretariat
Internal Audit
Secretariat, incl. Governance and Compliance Office
Chief Services Office
Vı´tor Constaˆncio, Vice-President
Macroprudential Policy and Financial Stability
Research
Benoˆıt Cœure´
Intern. and European Relations, Repr. in Washington, D.C.
Market Operations
Oversight of Payment Systems
Sabine Lautenschla¨ger
Vice-Chair of the Supervisory Board
Legal Services for SSM Issues (with Yves Mersch)
Statistics
Yves Mersch
Banknotes
Legal Services
Market Infrastructure and Payments
Risk Management
Peter Praet
Economics
Preparation of Monetary Policy Decisions
Notes: In addition, a Chief Services Officer, Michael Diemer, is responsible for administration,
budget and finance, human resources, and information systems. Source: European Central
Bank; see https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/pdf/orga/distributionofresp_EB.pdf
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Figure 1: Patterns of ECB Executive Board Member Activity over Time
Notes: The upper graph aggregates the number of calendar entries of Executive Board members
of the ECB by month. The lower graph aggregates, analogously, the number of calendar entries
by day of week. Data cover the periods 08/2014-07/2015 and 11/2015-10/2016.
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Figure 2: Publication Rules and Reported Board Member Activity
Notes: The figure plots coefficient estimates (and 95% confidence intervals) from regressions
similar to column 1 in Table 4, using the monthly number of reported activities in a given
category instead of the total number of activities as regressand.
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Figure 3: Economic Policy Uncertainty and Executive Board Member Activity
Notes: The solid line plots the economic policy uncertainty index for Europe from Baker, Bloom
and Davis (2016); the dashed line plots the total number of monthly calendar entries of Executive
Board members of the ECB (right scale).
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